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Discretion of Corporate Management To Do Good at the
Expense of Shareholder Gain-Canadian Corporate Law
Leon Getz*

The preliminary observation is this: The relationship between the judi-

cial material available on this subject and the speculative writing is
totally out of proportion. There are no more than a handful of decisions
concerning the extent to which managers may take into account noninvestor objectives. In Canada, there is only one case directly dealing
with the issue of charitable giving. Throughout the Commonwealth,
there are no more than a dozen cases dealing with the subject.
But the material from scholarly reflections and speculative literature
on the issues is now enormous. It is prodigious in the United States and
while the Anglo-Canadian material may not yet have reached that status,
it is certainly substantial. I take that to be significant, that is, the relative
infrequency with which the issue has arisen as a matter for decision in
English or Canadian courts. I think it is important at the outset to identify the kind of context in which this sort of question might arise, and I
want to give you a number of specific contexts.
A number of years ago, Canadian National Railways decided to reorganize its rail system in the prairies. This involved abandoning some
local branch lines and, in effect, deprived a number of small prairie communities of their reason for existence. When the railway ceased to stop
there, they no longer had any justification for existence. This created a
major disruption for these communities, and there was a major outcry
about it. That gave rise to a commission of inquiry, which is the Friedman Commission of Inquiry on Railway Run-throughs in Canada. Justice Friedman, a very distinguished member of the Canadian judiciary,
dealt with a variety of issues arising out of this proposal of the railway.
One of the things he said was this: "They owe an obligation to the community. Something ought to be done about it."
A second circumstance in which these issues have arisen occurred a
number of years ago: Crown Zellerbach decided to close down one of its
major pulp plants in British Columbia, in a place called Ocean Falls.
The only justification for the entire community of about 5,000 to 7,000
people was the Crown Zellerbach plant. The government moved in and
took over the Crown Zellerbach operation and continued to operate it,
apparently with success. The government said that this was necessary to
preserve employment.
* Freeman & Co. (Vancouver, B.C.).
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There is another context. A number of years ago, in the famous
Savoy Hotels1 affair, directors of an English company, who were apprehensive about the prospects of a takeover bid, took defensive measures
designed to insulate the company from the possibility of an effective takeover bid, and justified this action in terms of the national interest and the
balance of payments. An inspector was appointed, and he reported that
it was not a proper matter to be taken into account. Nothing turned on
that, but that's what happened.
In Canada, the question of the ownership of our resources has been
a lively issue of debate for many years. Relying on the approach taken in
the Savoy Hotels case, one might suppose that if a director of a Canadian
company were to resist a takeover by an American company on the
grounds that it would be contrary to the national interest, he would have
some difficulty in defending his action in a court of law. We have foreign
investment review legislation which has attempted to deal with this kind
of question.
There also exists an altogether different context. A recent English
case called Simmonds v. Heifer2 involved a so-called "company limited
by guarantee," which in our terms would be a non-profit corporation.
This company had the delightfully English name of "The League Against
Cruel Sports." The League Against Cruel Sports is set up, aside from the
question of its capital structure, in much the same way as any other English company. That is to say, it has a memorandum which defines its
purpose. The purpose of the League Against Cruel Sports was to promote animal welfare. In the 1979 general election in England, the Labor
Party committed itself through its manifesto to abolish, if elected, stag
hunting, deer coursing, and other similar activities.
The League thought that was wonderful. So its directors agreed to
make two donations. One for £30,000 and one for £50,000 to the Labor
Party. The £30,000 donation was specifically for the purpose of propagating the Labor Party's commitment to abolishing stag hunting. The
£50,000 donation was for the general purposes of the Labor Party. A
member of the League challenged this donation. It seems that it is one
thing to be against cruel sports, and another to be a socialist against cruel
sports. The court held that the donation, which was tied to propagating
the objectives of the League, was a proper donation. The general contribution to the Labor Party funds, however, was improper. The analysis
which was used was an ultra vires analysis. But the conclusion which
was reached on that analysis was an improper use of funds.
Let me point out the variety of these contexts. What was at stakein the railway run-through situation, in the Ocean Falls situation, and
arguably in the foreign investment review situation-was how to formulate a position as a matter of public policy, and what reflection, if any, to
1 Savoy Corp. Ltd. v. Development UnderwritingLtd. (1961), [1963] N.S.W.R. 138 (S.C.).
2 Simmonds v. Heifer (1983), [1983] B.C.L.C. 298 (Ch.).
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give to that determination of what public policy is or should be. In Simmonds v. Heffer,3 however, the context was an entirely different one. It
was a simple dispute between, in effect, two people, about how funds, to
which at least one of them made a claim, were going to be distributed.
Is it possible to devise a formula which provides a workable system
of rules-a decent set of standards- which can be applied by somebody
as the basis for a system of rights and remedies? To raise the general
question whether managers may sacrifice investor interests for non-investor objectives on the whole does not seem to me to be terribly helpful.
The question is: For what purpose is one raising that as a matter of
inquiry? Then you get into the issue whether it is possible, once you've
come to a conclusion about these matters, to devise a workable set of
rules.
This issue has always arisen in the judicial context as a claim that
rights have been infringed upon and obligations breached. That is a very
narrow context indeed. It always arises in a court and that is important
too, because the material which courts have to deal with, which courts
are capable of dealing with, is very limited. All of this is banal, but is not
unimportant.
What principles have the courts identified? In understanding the
English materials, one has got to bear in mind that the law is complicated
and often quite Byzantine. The capacity of corporations, objectives, and
powers (express powers and implied powers) are all being worked
through in the English case law. I do not think that is any longer of any
great significance. I think the essential principles are now clear. As far
as Canadian law is concerned, at least, the ultra vires doctrine is irrelevant because Canadian statutes now uniformly provide that corporations
have all the powers of a natural person.
What are the relevant principles? It comes down to a matter of direct distribution of duties. The principle is essentially that the power to
make charitable contributions, like any other power apparently vested in
corporation directors, is one to be exercised bona fide in the best interests
of the company as a whole. That is the formula. The application of that
formula is one about which it is not possible to say anything very useful
at all.
The reason why it is not possible to say anything of use at least on
the basis of the Canadian and English authorities, is that in the final
analysis two questions are at stake. First, did the directors act in what
they thought was the best interest of the company and for the benefit of
the company; and second, was their belief in this matter reasonably
grounded. That is, as I understand it, the sum and substance of Canadian law on this point.
If you take the issue of charitable contributions, it is permissible for
directors to make contributions to charity where it can plausibly be ar3
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CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 13:1 1988

gued, applying only legal principles, that there is some possibility of benefit to the corporation. How one determines benefit from charitable
contributions I do not know, which is why I assume the courts rely on
the tests of bona fides and "the reasonable man test." In the leading
English case on this point, Evans v. Brunner,Mond & Co.,4 the company
gave a charitable donation to the Imperial College for the training of
scientists on grounds, which were accepted by the court, that the cultivation of a scientific attitude of mind would ultimately be of benefit to Imperial Chemical Industries, the donor company.
Now I can think of all kinds of "attitudes of mind" which might
ultimately be of benefit to all kinds of companies. What I think is happening is that the courts first of all are extremely reluctant to intervene;
and secondly, the issue on balance has not been sufficiently significant to
warrant shareholder actions about them. So, where does that leave us?
It leaves us in a position that, provided the demonstration of philanthropic commitment on the part of corporations is not so remarkable as
to be worth anybody's time to litigate about it, it will not be litigated.
Beyond that, if it is litigated, there are no serviceable standards which
courts can apply, at least on the basis of the existing authorities, for determining the propriety of these kinds of activities. Bona fides is generally easy to establish in the charitable giving context. Benefit to the
company is extremely difficult to establish in the charitable giving context. And so what we end up with is an almost complete and untrammeled license to corporations to pursue the philanthropic instincts of
their managers.
Let me tell you a little story in this connection. I happen to be interested in renaissance music, and I prefer to hear it played on renaissance
instruments. Now, that's a kind of archaic taste. Not everybody likes
listening to a krummhorn and a viola da gamba, particularly in combination. There is a society for renaissance music in the city in which I live,
and it survives on corporate charitable contributions. I recently asked
the directors of a large corporation if they would make a contribution.
They said: "You're a lawyer-tell us whether we're permitted to do so."
I said: "On the one hand, and on the other hand, but please give me the
money and don't tell anybody about it." I got the money and they did
not tell anybody about it. It was quite a substantial amount of money, all
things considered. It was, by the way, a machine tool company that gave
me the money because one of their directors happens to like krummhorns, too. I think it reminds him of the factory.
I cannot conceive of any legal justification for what he did. There is
no available body of law to justify what he did. It has long been thought
that the decision in the Evans5 case provided this general justification:
that whatever is good for the community is, in some form or another,
4 Evans v. Brunner, Mond & Co. (1920), [1921] 1 Ch. 359.

5 Ibid.
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good for the corporation which operates within it. But I think that Simmonds v. Heifer,6 a rather unusual English case, has thrown a bit of cold
water on that. I have some considerable doubts now about the propriety,
as a matter of corporate law, of much of what passes for charitable giving. I am not interested in the question of whether it is tax defensible;
that's a separate question in my view. The status of a lot of what passes
for political contributions by corporations-direct contributions to the
political process-now seems to me to be very much in question as a
matter of corporate law.
Which leads me to the question: What next? First, ought we to
have a set of rules governing this matter that is any more precise than the
existing set of rules? Second, could that set of rules plausibly take the
position, or start from the assumption, that anything other than fringe
activity by corporations which relates to, or has the result of sacrificing
investor objectives, is defensible? My answer to both is no. Number one,
I do not think it is possible to have a set of rules which deals with anything more than fringe questions. Number two, I do not think that any
set of rules can plausibly warrant the sacrifice of investor interest in any
significant way.
As to the first point, I am hard-pressed in the context of a dispute
between claims on a common fund (on the part of shareholders, creditors, corporations and their employees) on the one hand, and a vague
public interest on the other, to identify a set of criteria which would enable the court to deal with the matter. As to the second question, I am
hard-pressed to think of anything that could usefully emerge from a set
of "normative rules" which would require corporations to sacrifice investor objectives in the context of either charitable political contributions or
general philanthropic or social activities. I do not think that's the way
society works. I am not a political scientist. But I do not believe that we
are capable of devising a set of rules which provides workable criteria.
And I do not think there is any evidence to suggest that the successful
pursuit of social goals is accomplished by corporate management any
more efficiently than it is accomplished by a whole variety of other institutions in the community and by a lot of separate individual choices.
The points, then, are the following:
First, Anglo-Canadian law permits marginal non-investor-related
activity. The test is: was it done bona fide in the best interest of the
company as a whole, that is, bona fide with'a view to the economic advantage of the corporation as an entity. There are some fuzzy edges to
that formula.
Second, the conventional analysis of these issues in Canada and in
England has been a mixture of the capacity analysis and the director
duty analysis, but the capacity analysis is, for Canadian purposes, largely
6

Simmonds v. Heifer, supra, note 2 at 298.
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irrelevant and for English purposes is in the process of becoming
irrelevant.
Third, the test is "benefit."
Fourth, because the nature of the benefit test is one which largely
immunizes it from effective scrutiny-because it is impossible to establish
the kinds of relationships involved between a particular form of non-economic activity and the economic benefit of the corporation-the only recourse we have is to what the Americans refer to as the business
judgment rule combined with the tests of bona fides and "reasonable man
under the circumstances."
Fifth, I do not believe that it is possible to devise an alternate set of
rules, at least not without the complete restructuring of the fundamental
assumptions of corporate law, which would permit or encourage the sacrifice of non-investor goals-which would be counter-productive.
And that gives rise to the final question which is, given that there is
this activity, and given that the nature of the activity is one for which the
existing rules are largely adequate, is there anything else that we ought to
be concerned about? I think there is one other thing that we ought to be
concerned about: that to the greatest extent this kind of activity (with
one conspicuous exception) goes largely unpublicized by corporations.
What they are actually up to is not a matter of public record. And they
are extremely reluctant to talk about it in many instances.
The question then becomes, do we have an interest in public disclosure of these matters, and if so, how and where? There is now a requirement in England, though I am not sure what the position is in Canada,
for publication in financial statements of charitable and political contributions, at least in the aggregate. A recent royal commission in Canada
has recommended that there should be disclosure of this information.
The question is: Why? Is it because one wishes shareholders to
know what is being done with their money, or is it because one is concerned about a broader set of social and political implications of this kind
of activity. In that case, it seems to me that the issue is whether the
financial statement mechanism-the shareholder democracy mechanism,
the corporate responsibility mechanism within the corporation-is the
appropriate vehicle for this.
I do not know the answer to that question. The English rule does
not seem to go to the quality of management. And I am not sure that the
interest of shareholders extends much beyond the quality of management. Given that the activity is largely peripheral, I wonder whether the
appropriate method of disclosure is through the proxy system and the
financial statement route, or is it something in the nature of baggage that
the corporate law system ought not be forced to bear? I do not know the
answer to that question. I go backwards and forwards over it. Maybe it
is a problem about public policy formulation, in which case disclosure in
conventional forms is not the right way of doing it. I raise it merely as a
question.

